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Column:  
Analysis of Digital Traces 
Fred Cohen 
 
In part 1 of this series (Cohen, 2011a), Analysis of digital traces is a 
foundational process by which the examiner, typically using computer software 
tools, comes to understand and answer basic questions regarding digital traces. 
“Input sequences to digital systems produce outputs and state changes as a 
function of the previous state. To the extent that the state or outputs produce 
stored and/or captured bit sequences, these form traces of the event sequences 
that caused them. Thus the definition of a trace may be stated as: "A set of bit 
sequences produced from the execution of a finite state machine." (FSM)”1 
Starting with a bag-of-bits 
As a fundamental, when handed some set of digital evidence, it is a good 
working assumption that the examiner doesn't know what it is other than the 
fact that it is a trace or traces. This is sometimes called a “bag of bits” to 
indicate that, other than the fact that it is comprised of bits, the examiner really 
knows nothing more about it. 
In cases where the examiner also performed collection, the details of the 
collection process may also be known, and so forth. The examiner may also 
rely on statements, paperwork, claims, and all manner of other things to put the 
bag of bits into context, but at the start of the examination, anything outside of 
the personal knowledge of the examiner
2
 should be treated as speculative and 
subject to refutation. Analysis is largely about performing computations on the 
bag of bits and related information to produce analytical products and derived 
traces. These products are then used to interpret, attribute, reconstruct, present, 
and otherwise work with the evidence to other examiners, lawyers, triers of 
fact, etc. But in order to do this, something about the bag of bits must support 
or refute hypotheses about what it contains. 
Redundancy within and between the bag of bits 
Redundancy is inherent in human and current computer language, it is 
fundamental to the notion of syntax and the ability to differentiate legitimate 
                                                 
1 F. Cohen, “Digital Forensic Evidence Examination”, 4th ed. 2012. Chapter 5 is used without 
further citation throughout this column and should be referred to for a more in-depth review 
of the subject matter. 
2 Note that knowledge is not the same as the other elements of the required basis for expertise 
in US courts; experience, training, skills, and education. Personal knowledge in this case is 
intended to imply only things the examiner did and saw. 
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from illegitimate syntax, and without redundancy, reliability
3
 cannot be 
assured. Fortunately, there is a great deal of redundancy in most digital traces. 
This redundancy comes in two general forms; internal redundancy (within) and 
external redundancy (between). 
Internal redundancy is present within the internal structure of bit sequences 
within the bag of bits. For example, if the bag of bits contains a sequence of 
bits produced by a particular global positioning system (GPS) receiver, it might 
use the GPX format
4
 which uses and XML schema
5
 and includes the name of 
the vendor and sequences of points in 4-dimensional space-time. Internal 
redundancy comes in syntactic requirements of the language and the specific 
implementation of the device. GPX, “tags” such as “<time>” and “</time>” 
surround ASCII text indicated in a format “YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ssZ”. If 
content includes a sequence “<time> 2012-05-10T17:35:23Z</time>” an 
examiner should readily determine it as inconsistent with the internal format of 
these files, a type C (internal) inconsistency
6
, and doubt the reliability of the 
record. In this case, is that there is no “ “ (space) between tags and content in 
the implementation.
7
 Thus a header indicating the GPS type combined with the 
syntax is internally inconsistent. 
External redundancy, also called “between” records, relates to external 
information. For example, we can determine that GPS systems did not exist in 
1901 and that therefore, any record indicating a date and time of that era would 
be inconsistent with the external records. A date indicating “1901-23-49...” 
would be of the correct format but externally inconsistent, a type D 
inconsistency, and an examiner should readily doubt its reliability. 
Thus, the examiner uses analysis methods to examine traces in light of the 
redundant nature of such traces to confirm or refute hypotheses about the 
content in context. In effect, the examiner uses analysis to place content in 
context and turn the bag of bits into one or more hypothesized meaningful 
expressions in a syntax associated with mechanisms that produce such 
sequences. In addition, the examiner uses analysis to exclude hypothesized 
event sequences and contexts based on type C and D consistency. 
Turning the bag of bits into meaningful content in context 
The manner in which examiners typically proceed short cuts this, in that they 
typically start with assumptions and, unless the assumptions are obviously and 
dramatically violated, continue under them, even in the face of increasing 
                                                 
3 Reliability relates to the extent to which it reflects the reality it purports. 
4 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_eXchange_Format 
5 See: http://www.w3.org/XML/Schema 
6 Details of Type C and D in “Digital Forensic Evidence Examination” I.b.i.d. 
7 e.g., GPX file produced by a Garmin Oregon 400t hand-held GPS unit. 
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evidence to the contrary. 
For example, using a tool like EnCase™,8 an examiner might load a “disk 
image”9 and start “analysis”. EnCase might identify the disk image as 
containing a region with a Windows™ NTFS file system partition based on the 
content of the first 512 bytes of the disk image, assuming that region of the 
image to be a “partition table”, and attempt to analyze that region of the disk as 
if it were such a file system. As long as this process seems to produce sensible 
results, the examiner will typically ignore all other possibilities, and proceed on 
that basis. The tool uses designer assumptions to do an analysis, interpret the 
results of that analysis, and present those interpretations under the set of 
assumptions provided by the designer and the user, typically doing so 
implicitly rather than explicitly. The user typically sees only the presentation of 
interpreted analysis results, and if desired, can drill down into the presentation 
of interpreted bases in traces for those results. 
An example of a misinterpretation based on analytical assumptions presented 
to an examiner by EnCase
10
 was the presentation of a date and time indicating 
writing a document in the middle of the Atlantic ocean when in fact it could not 
have been produced there.
11
 In this particular case, erroneous interpretation and 
representation was the result of a shift in time zones between daylight savings 
and standard times between the date used by the examiner and present at the 
beginning of the records under examination and the dates associated with the 
specific file under examination. In the same case, automated analysis also 
ignored the second of pairs of date and time stamps within files where there 
were differences between those dates and times indicative of different time 
bases in different systems. 
All current tools that perform automated analysis, interpretation, and 
presentation, produce these sorts of results, and it is the job of the modern 
examiner to understand this. In particular, it is important for the examiner to 
understand the specifics of the analytical process, examine the results of 
analysis against the original traces and methods used, and recognize 
inconsistencies leading to false interpretation and presentation. Just because 
these sorts of faulty assumptions and mechanisms are present in these tools, 
doesn't make the results invalid. It does, however, put the onus on the examiner 
to understand the limits of their tools. 
                                                 
8 This is one of the most popular and commonly used tools in digital forensics today and is 
produced by Guidance Software. 
9 Typically a representation of the bit sequence found on a disk drive or partition within a disk 
drive. 
10 There is no intent to disparage this product as opposed to others, it is only a popular example. 
11 United States v. Bayly, et. al., United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, case 
no. Cr. No. H-03-363. 
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Analytical methods 
There are a relatively small number of well understood, published, and peer 
reviewed analytical methods used in digital forensics today. The generally fall 
into a set of areas outlined here, and differ between structured (i.e., following 
specific rules for syntax and typically produced by fully automated 
mechanisms based on digital data) and unstructured (i.e., the result of 
codification of naturally occurring phenomena into digital representations, such 
a digital photographs or sound recordings) content. 
Feature and characteristic detection and analysis 
Based on assumptions and hypotheses regarding the bag of bits, and subject to 
refutation at any time, traces are parsed into syntactic structures and the 
particular elements within those structures. This is a finitely recursive process 
of identifying a context (i.e., characteristic), identifying content (i.e., features) 
within that context, and then treating the content as context for further feature 
and characteristic detection and analysis. For structured content, characteristics 
like the document type and its syntax form the context for identifying features 
like combinations of words used within it and 
types of spelling errors, if any. In the unstructured content arena, characteristics 
like the arrangement of pixels in a two dimensional grid contained within a 
graphical image are treated as context for extracting and analyzing features, 
such as areas that look like eyes, tables, or grass. 
Recursively, sentences and may be analyzed for language, syntax, spelling, 
sentence structure, word usage, and so forth. And eyes in a picture may be 
analyzed as for presence within a face, number and placement, eye color, and 
so forth. The resulting recursive structures may be further analyzed for 
consistency with internal or external records, such as whether any people have 
5 eyes, or when  capitalization is normally used. 
Symbol set identification 
Part and parcel of the analysis process is the assumption and validation of 
symbol sets. For example, XML is generally composed of ASCII character 
sets, excluding select byte codes and forcing other byte codes (e.g., the code for 
“<”) to be used only in specific ways and in specific places. Identifying symbol 
sets is vital to parsing and to differentiating internal and external consistencies. 
Structured and unstructured content are generated from and analyzed to 
produce symbolic representations. The symbol sets of representations act to 
define and restrict the analytical framework, and inconsistencies with the 
analytical framework above base rates are strong indicators of an error in 
assumptions or hypotheses of the analysis process. 
Trace typing 
Based on symbol set identification, trace typing is done to identify the specific 
type of the trace. Typically, this can exist at many levels, such as determining 
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that content is consistent with ASCII text, in a line-oriented format with fields 
separated by commas, containing fixed and variable length fields, etc. This can 
be used to hypothesize about the mechanisms associated with the trace, for 
example, if the trace is typed to a particular version of a particular device. This 
may then be used to perform other analysis under the assumptions regarding 
the operation of the mechanisms known to produce these types of traces. 
Parsers, search methods, and related mechanisms 
Search is one of the mainstays of digital forensic analysis. In its essence, search 
looks for patterns within bit sequences. Well known and longstanding methods 
for computerized search have been studied over many years and they are 
applied to look for exact sequence matches and regular expressions. Other sorts 
of search are far more rare, but in the broad sense, parsers may also be used for 
search. In this case, finite state machines (FSMs) are run against sequences of 
bits to identify symbol structures within the syntax assumed for parsing. They 
typically produce parse trees that are then analyzed further to identify content 
of interest, or elements are placed in databases for subsequent searching and 
analysis. 
Normalization and derived traces 
Rather than trying to specify all ways in which the same content may be 
expressed, normalization is used to translate traces into derived traces that 
reflect a standardized form of the content. For example, all ASCII coded 
characters may be mapped into lower case characters so that searches may 
proceed regardless of the case of the lettering. Similarly, “Jim”, “James”, 
“Jimmy”, “Jimbo”, and “J.Jones@JamesJones.Com” might be mapped into 
“James” as normalization and placed into a derived trace so that searches for 
the named individual will find all of those forms. Time and dates may all be 
translated into YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.dddd format, while multiple 
spaces, tabs or other whitespace separators may be translated into a single 
space. The list goes on and depends on notions of equivalence or similarity in 
syntax and semantics. 
Similarity analysis and related methods 
Similarity analysis is based on some definition of relationships between traces. 
The relationship is codified in a metric which is then measured between 
different traces. The result of applying the metric is then used to establish 
similarity relative to that metric. For example, two email messages may be 
similar in size if they contain the same number of bits. Multiple relationship 
metrics may be applied to establish a set of factors that are similar between sets 
of bit sequences, so that groups of traces are identified as similar or dissimilar 
to a level with respect to the defined relationship metric.  
Time sequencing, travel patterns, and related methods 
Analysis of time, movement, and event sequencing is particularly interesting in 
digital forensics because of the desire to establish what happened when and the 
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availability of a very rich set of records relating time at varying precision and 
accuracy. While timestamps may record time and date to the second or 
millisecond, the basis for those times relative to events at issue are somewhat 
more dubious. For example, an accurate record of the execution of a program 
to the nearest second is commonly available, but the process of execution may 
have lasted for a period of minutes, hours, or days. Understanding what the 
timestamp actually reflects in terms of that execution may not be provided by 
the timestamp. Most analysis today simply sorts by time and providers the 
ordered list of identified records, but this is often misleading in terms of the 
actual event sequence or relevance. Time sequences are often used to establish 
travel patterns, such as the use of sequences of credit card transactions at 
different retail outlets being used to establish that the person using the credit 
card went from place to place or was or was not capable of being at a particular 
place at a particular time. But analysis is not attribution. 
Anchor events 
Anchor events are events external to the traces that can act to tie down traces to 
externalities. For example, if a message contains bit sequences that are 
typically associated external systems, events in those external systems may be 
used to anchor the events asserted to be related to the records reflected in the 
traces. Traces produced by electronic mail processes typically include 
sequences bits that include “Received:” headers reflecting timestamps added by 
mail transfer agents in the path from origination to destination. By finding 
records of other messages passing through the same external MTAs in the same 
time frame, and when those records' timestamps are independently determined 
reliable (e.g., by the examiner having operated the systems that allow 
timestamps to be validated as reliable), those anchor events provide external 
context that can be used in analysis. 
Building sieves and counting things 
Many examinations involve producing counts of various things. For example, a 
count of how many times a particular telephone number appeared in a log of 
calls made by a suspect might be relevant to establishing that a relationship 
existed between two parties or their phone numbers. Many other things are 
counted in analysis, and this is an area where computers are particularly useful 
and reliable, if properly applied.  In order to count things, computers typically 
sieve in or out the things of interest or non-interest, leaving the sieved portion 
of traces to be counted. For example, to find the number of times two phone 
numbers communicated to each other when the individuals associated with 
those phone numbers were known to be in different cities, a sieve might be 
produced to extract relevant phone records and the results counted. Note that 
such a sieve is not typically available off-hand, and that the examiner is 
typically called upon to build such a sieve. Once build, many examiners share 
the details of their methods with others and thus build up a library of partial 
solutions to analytical problems that they reuse or alter for another purpose 
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over time. 
Presentation and human cognitive analysis 
The human visual cortex and brain is far better at rapidly detecting certain 
classes of patterns than computers. As a result, one of the most common 
analytical techniques is to produce a graphical image reflective of a set of 
traces relative to a context and have the examiner identify things of interest to 
the matter at hand. An example of this is in the analysis of graphical depictions 
of patterns of communications between groups, where people very quickly 
identify “key players” once the data is presented in an amenable manner. 
Similarly, when experts examine things like email headers, they rapidly detect 
things that “just don't look right”, and can often explain them once seen. After 
this has been done a number of times, there is a tendency for someone to come 
up with automation to perform such analysis, and the automation of the 
analysis area largely grows by turning human cognitive methods into 
automated programs to perform the same or similar functions without the 
dependency on human judgment, and with repeatability and scalability that far 
exceeds what people can do. 
Traceability to original traces. 
A final critical factor in analysis is that analytical results are normally traceable 
directly to the specific traces associated with those results. Thus, unlike 
programs that merely sort times, a forensic analysis of times associated with 
traces will ultimately have to be able to be shown to relate the sorted times to 
the traces used to producing those times. Thus derived traces need to link back 
to their origins, normalization requires association with the original traces that 
were normalized, and so forth. 
A final comment 
This description of analysis and its methods is not comprehensive, but it may 
be a reasonable starting point. To the extent that many things are missed in this 
description, other works attempt to be more comprehensive.
1
 But this is a 
growing and evolving field, and more is better when it comes to identifying 
methods that have been applied, studied, tested, and published. As always, we 
welcome your expansion of the art and science and our lists of elements of 
those. 
In our ongoing efforts to define and detail the science and art of digital 
forensics, standard terminology and common understandings have been found 
to be an important and largely unfulfilled need.
12
 But findings also indicate that 
by starting to use common words we produce common understandings and 
consensus around the issues of the emerging science. By describing the field as 
                                                 
12 F. Cohen, “Update on the State of the Science of Digital Evidence Examination”, Conference 
on Digital Forensics, Security, and the Law, 2012 
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a whole, and in this short piece the elements of analysis, we hope to bring 
about a unified language and understanding of the field that will help the 
emerging science to form and the practitioners of the art to communicate and 
operate as scientists. 
But consensus does not come from me telling you what to think or how to say 
it. It comes from increasing numbers of members of the field adopting common 
definitions, terminology, and methodology, applying it themselves, and 
demanding it of others. This is up to you as my readers to decide. As always, 
feedback helps, and we welcome it. Add your voice to the consensus by 
responding to this editorial with your views. 
 
 
